A friend of mine had just finished his conversion to a Beechcraft Baron. "Ah! It's great to finally be rated on the Baron range,� he said. "Not so," I replied. "Technically, you are now rated to fly only that particular Baron". Disappointment turned into astonishment as I explained.

I have long since lost count of the number of different Barons I have flown but they are indeed all different. I am not only talking about the different models of 55's or 58's, or turbo-charged or pressurized variations, but also variations in supposedly identical models.

If you regularly fly aircraft types other than Barons, then it is a good idea to entrench the practice of keeping your right hand on the throttles during take-off and landing. This is not just a case of being a good boy scout, but could well save your life. Most aircraft manufacturers have standardized the throttle-quadrant layout and have the throttle controls left, pitch levers in the middle, and the mixture controls on the right. On the Baron the throttles are in the middle where the pitch levers normally sleep. When on final approach, if you become distracted and take your hand off the throttle controls, and then absent-mindedly put your hand back onto them again, there is a better than zero chance of putting your hand on the pitch levers instead. This could be disastrous if you now try and reduce power and find that you are pulling the pitch levers into the feather indent instead. This of course holds true for all Barons.

Another friend of mine explained how he had become used to one particular Baron 58. On this particular Baron, as with most, the landing light switches were the last two on the right hand side of a row of electrical switches above the pilot’s knees. Came the day he had to fly a different Baron 58. On this particular example, the last two electrical switches were for the electric fuel pumps. As he was turning on to final approach, as per usual, he switched on the landing lights, or so he thought. He had in fact switched the electric fuel pumps on to high. Now, a Baron doesn't take kindly to this sort of treatment and his initial alarm at the two rough-running engines turned into terror when he was greeted by an eerie silence as soon as he reduced power. As luck would have it, he made it to the runway with his heavy glider but has since developed a deep distrust of switch placement in these otherwise fine aircraft.

Another, and more well known, quirk is that on most Barons the undercarriage lever is on the right of the panel while the flap lever is on the left. On the P-Baron, the manufacturer decided to switch these around and put the undercarriage lever on the left. This is why it is good practice to leave well enough alone after touch-down and wait until the aircraft has been pulled clear of the runway and stopped before retracting the flaps. It is not entirely unlikely that you may reach for the undercarriage instead. Trust me on this one. Been there, done that. Also, on Barons where the flap lever is on the left, the lever itself has been carefully positioned so as to be un-reachable unless you are a skilled contortionist.

How many people know that Barons have a control lock for the rudder pedals as well as the control column. If you are one of those pilots that taxi with differential braking rather than with rudder and differential power, as should be the case, you may actually become airborne with the rudder lock still in place. Rather don't go there.

Some well-equipped Barons have limited space on their instrument panels and this has led to some inventive solutions. I remember once flying a Baron, which had the transponder installed in the cubbyhole due to there being a total lack of excess space anywhere else. Early the next morning my telephone rang. It was one of the company pilots and from the background noise he was obviously parked at the holding point. He wanted to know where the heck the transponder was. (He used stronger language than that). The next morning, yet another company pilot was flying the same aircraft. His ATC clearance went something like this: "alpha bravo charlie, squawk 6132, it's in the cubbyhole".  

If, when in the cruise, you decide to flip the control column over to your passenger for a go, you will be in for a surprise if you then try and flip it back after reducing power significantly. You will first have to either apply full throttle or pull the control column back before it can be successful returned to its rightful position in front of the pilot. Once again, rather don't go there.

Last, but not least, always check for the position of the avionics master switch before starting the engines. In Barons, I have found them in some strange places, normally well hidden.

In summary, is the Beechcraft Baron a pleasure to fly? You betcha! 

FAULTY MAINTENANCE, INADEQUATE FAA OVERSIGHT CITED IN MIAMI SEAPLANE CRASH

Washington, DC - The National Transportation Safety Board today determined that the probable cause of the crash of a seaplane in Miami, FL, in late 2005, was "the failure and separation of the right wing, which resulted from (1) the failure of Chalk's Ocean Airways' maintenance program to identify and properly repair fatigue cracks in the wing, and (2) the failure of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) to detect and correct deficiencies in the company's maintenance program."

On December 19, 2005, a Grumman Turbo Mallard (G-73T) amphibious airplane, on a regularly scheduled passenger flight to Bimini, Bahamas, experienced an in-flight separation of its right wing from the fuselage and crashed into the shipping channel adjacent to the Port of Miami shortly after takeoff.  Two flight crewmembers and 18 passengers on board were killed; the airplane was destroyed by impact forces.  

"This accident tragically illustrates a gap in the safety net with regard to older airplanes," said NTSB Chairman Mark V. Rosenker.  "The signs of structural problems were there - but not addressed.  And to ignore continuing problems is to court disaster."

The Board found that neither the performance nor the appearance of the airplane would have provided a warning to the flight crew of the right wing's imminent failure. The accident airplane, manufactured in 1947, was operating within its certificated design envelope and carrying normal aerodynamic loads when the wing separated. Preexisting damage to wing structural components would not have been visible to the flight crew prior to departure. There was nothing the crew could have done to regain control of the airplane after the in-flight separation of the wing, the Board said.
 
The Board noted that the accident airplane had a history of recurring fuel leaks near the area where the right wing separated that were indicators of internal structural damage. Although some repairs were attempted, many were ineffective in that they did not properly restore the load-carrying capability of the wing structure. The failure of Chalk's to identify and properly repair fatigue cracks in the wing, and the numerous maintenance-related problems found on the accident airplane and another company airplane, demonstrated that Chalk's maintenance program was inadequate to maintain the structural integrity of the company's fleet, the Board said.

The Board also noted that because of the limited availability of engineering services and manufacturer support for the G-73T Mallards, effective FAA oversight was important to maintain the airworthiness of these older airplanes. Although FAA oversight was performed in accordance with existing federal regulations, the Board said, it did not result in the detection and correction of
the systemic deficiencies in Chalk's maintenance program and, therefore, was insufficient to ensure the safety of the airline's operations.

As a result of the investigation, the Board issued two new safety recommendations calling on the FAA to: verify that airline maintenance programs include stringent criteria to address recurring or systemic problems, if necessary through comprehensive engineering evaluations; and, to modify procedures for oversight of maintenance programs of carriers like Chalk's to ensure the continued airworthiness of the operator's fleet.

Earlier in the investigation, concerns were raised about federal regulations that exempt airplanes like the accident
airplane, that were type-certificated before January 1, 1958, from a requirement for more rigorous damage tolerance-based supplemental inspections.  Consequently, on July 24, 2006, the NTSB issued a recommendation (A-06-52) urging the FAA to eliminate the exemption for these older airplanes.

As the FAA has indicated that it intends to address the identification of age-related problems for older airplanes through current operational safety programs, the Board has classified this recommendation as "Open-Unacceptable Response."

"Does it make sense," said Chairman Rosenker, "that rules designed to deal with the problems of airplanes as they age
would exclude the oldest ones in the inventory?"

A synopsis of the Board's report, including the probable cause and safety recommendations, is available on the NTSB
website, www.ntsb.gov, under "Board Meetings." The full report will be available on the website in several weeks.